## **Project: PCM Survival in Peru (1980–Present)**

### **Title**

"Cabinet under Pressure: Survival Analysis of Peru’s Prime Ministers Since 1980"

### **Abstract (Draft)**

This study examines the political durability of Peru’s Prime Ministers (Presidente del Consejo de Ministros, PCM) since the country’s democratic return in 1980. Using survival analysis, we explore how political context, institutional conditions, and crisis dynamics shape the tenure of these key presidential appointees. Through a Cox proportional hazards model, we test the influence of presidential popularity, legislative fragmentation, cabinet reshuffles, and regime instability on the risk of early dismissal or resignation. The results illuminate how informal power-sharing and institutional fragility influence executive coordination in a hyper-presidential regime.

### **1. Introduction**

* **Puzzle:** The newly compiled dataset (see Appendix A) shows that the **median Prime‑Ministerial tenure is just 254 days (≈ 8.3 months)**. Yet variation is huge: **Ántero Flores‑Aráoz served only six days in November 2020**, while **Manuel Ulloa** lasted **864 days** in the early 1980s, and **Jorge del Castillo** survived **805 days** during Alan García’s second term. Such dispersion persists even within the same presidential period—for instance, three PCMs cycled through Pedro Castillo’s first five months, whereas Alberto Otárola remained in office for 440 days under Dina Boluarte. **Why do some PCMs become disposable lightning rods, while others weather legislative censure, corruption scandals, and economic shocks?** This stark inconsistency in survival under similar institutional rules motivates our core inquiry: **which political, institutional, and situational factors condition the durability of Peru’s Prime Ministers?**
* **Significance:** Although Peru’s Constitution defines the PCM as merely the president’s first minister—tasked with countersigning decrees and coordinating the cabinet—practice since 1980 shows that the office routinely performs **head‑of‑government functions**: drafting the policy agenda, negotiating confidence votes, and serving as the executive’s face in congressional interpellations. The Prime Minister is therefore the president’s chief political shield. When things go well, the PCM articulates legislative compromises and signals technocratic competence; when crises erupt, the office becomes a **“circuit‑breaker”**—a high‑visibility scapegoat whose dismissal seeks to absorb congressional anger while preserving presidential tenure. Understanding the determinants of PCM survival thus reveals how Peru’s hyper‑presidential system manages accountability, blame, and policy coordination in the absence of strong parties.
* Research question: What factors influence the duration of PCM terms in Peru?

### **2. Background: The PCM Role in Peru**

* **Legal foundations (Art. 124, 1993 Constitution):** The PCM is *named by the President* but becomes fully operative only after the Council of Ministers receives a congressional vote of confidence (Art. 130). Article 124 establishes five formal powers that lift the office above an ordinary minister: **(1)** countersigning every presidential decree and law, thereby granting legal validity; **(2)** convening and presiding over the Council of Ministers when the President is absent; **(3)** coordinating sectoral policies and monitoring implementation across ministries; **(4)** presenting the government’s general policy and annual budget bill to Congress; and **(5)** proposing—on behalf of the Council—votes of confidence or requesting the President to dissolve Congress after two denials. Taken together, these clauses make the PCM the linchpin between executive decree authority and legislative oversight, subject to individual censure (Art. 132) and collective cabinet responsibility. This constitutional design explains why dismissing the PCM can defuse political crises without toppling the President.
* **Informal evolution: From symbolic coordinator to key political operator.** In the early 1980s the PCM was largely a *symbolic* co‑signatory—Manuel Ulloa chaired cabinet meetings but real bargaining occurred directly between President Belaúnde and party caucuses. Two changes transformed the post:
  1. **Fujimori’s executive re‑engineering (1990‑2000):** frequent decree lawmaking and the 1992 Constitution concentrated agenda control in the Palace. The PCM became the *de facto* gatekeeper of emergency decrees, crisis communication, and IMF negotiations. Guillermo Larco Cox’s 1989 and Hurtado Miller’s 1990 tenures were early signs; by 1995 Dante Córdova was publicly branded “Premier,” marking a rhetorical shift from *coordinator* to *operator*.
  2. **Confidence‑vote politics after 2000:** Article 130 requires each new Council to obtain a congressional vote of confidence, but presidents have repeatedly weaponised the PCM to reset relations with an antagonistic Congress—e.g., Salomón Lerner (2011), César Villanueva (2013, 2018), Pedro Cateriano (2020). The PCM now drafts policy speeches, counts votes, and negotiates floor time, acting as a *quasi‑prime minister* in a party‑fragmented legislature.

Consequently, career technocrats and seasoned politicians alike view the PCM as the highest non‑presidential prize—yet also the first political “fuse” to blow when scandals erupt. Our duration data confirm this duality: the office’s power has grown, but so has its volatility, illustrating the gap between formal rules and informal political practice.

* **Role during key periods:**• **Democratic transition (1980–1989):** Under Belaúnde and García I, the PCM was chiefly a coalition‑balancing *broker*: Manuel Ulloa, Fernando Schwalb, and Luis Alva Castro used the office to mediate between the president and newly elected party caucuses, but limited decree use kept the post largely symbolic. Average tenure ≈ 450 days.  
  • **Fujimori era (1990–2000):** Executive decree authority and the 1992 Constitution turned the PCM into the president’s *operational shield*. PMs like Hurtado Miller (199 days) and Pandolfi (792 days across two spells) managed IMF talks and emergency legislation, yet were dismissed when inflation, corruption, or congressional frictions peaked—underscoring the role as *sacrificial buffer*.  
  • **Post‑2000 democratic turbulence:** With weak parties and fragmented congresses, the PCM became the pivot for **confidence‑vote politics**. Thirty‑four different PMs have served since 2001, median tenure just **232 days**. Presidents Toledo, Humala, Vizcarra, Castillo, and Boluarte each used rapid PCM turnover to re‑negotiate legislative support—e.g., Cateriano’s 22‑day tenure (2020) followed by Martos’s 96 days as the executive searched for votes of confidence.

### **3. Literature Review**

* **Prime ministerial survival in semi-presidential or hybrid regimes:** Empirical work shows that the strategic logic of coalition maintenance and partisan bargaining strongly shapes how long a prime‑minister‑type appointee lasts. **Amorim Neto (2006)**, analysing more than 1,000 minister spells in ten semi‑presidential countries (1972–1999), finds that (i) prime ministers who belong to the president’s party or to pivotal coalition partners face significantly lower hazards of exit, and (ii) periods of *cohabitation* sharply increase replacement risk because presidents have incentives to reshuffle PMs allied with the rival camp. **Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004)** compare cabinet durability across regime types and show that survival is shortest under pure presidentialism, longest under parliamentarism, with semi‑presidential systems in between; within the latter, minority presidents and higher party fragmentation elevate the hazard of PM turnover. These results highlight three mechanisms—partisan alignment, coalition breadth, and executive–legislative congruence—that our Peruvian PCM analysis will explicitly test.
* **Cabinet instability in Peru:** Research converges on three reinforcing explanations. **Levitsky (1999)** shows that the collapse of the party system during the 1990s replaced partisan accountability with presidential patronage, turning ministers into expendable crisis‑management tools. **Tanaka (2005)** extends this argument, demonstrating that post‑Fujimori presidents continued to operate with a “government without parties,” relying on technocrats and ad‑hoc legislative deals; ministerial turnover spikes when congressional support wanes or censure motions loom. **Dargent (2015)** adds that corruption scandals and waves of social protest often prompt strategic cabinet sacrifices, with presidents dismissing Prime Ministers to deflect blame. Collectively, these studies depict cabinet instability as a product of weak party institutionalization, contentious executive–legislative relations, and recurrent political crises—mechanisms our survival analysis of PCM tenure will test.
* **Informal institutions and elite turnover:** **Helmke & Levitsky (2004)** define informal institutions as socially shared, unwritten rules that structure political behaviour and interact with formal rules in four distinct ways—**complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive**. In much of Latin America, competing and substitutive informal institutions are common and often undermine formal cabinet‑appointment procedures. Presidents rely on personalised patron‑client networks, strategic scapegoating norms, and informal blame‑shifting rituals to manage crises, which accelerates elite turnover. In Peru, where party institutionalisation is weak, an unwritten convention has emerged: when legislative censure or scandal threatens presidential standing, the Prime Minister is sacrificed as a cost‑containing signal of accountability, enabling the president to reset relations with Congress without relinquishing core power. This suggests that PCM survival hinges not only on formal constitutional design but also on the strength and interaction of informal institutions—a mechanism we incorporate by modelling the hazard of exit during periods of heightened informal bargaining (e.g., minority governments, non‑programmatic coalitions, corruption scandals).
* Previous survival analyses in political contexts: Brief review of studies applying survival analysis methods (Cox proportional hazards models) to political leadership and ministerial positions, drawing comparisons and identifying gaps relevant to the Peruvian context. Include also Huber and Martinez-Gallardo's (2008) analysis of ministerial stability in parliamentary democracies, highlighting how institutional factors and political dynamics in parliamentary systems might offer valuable comparative insights for analyzing ministerial durability in presidential systems like Peru. Additionally, González-Bustamante and Olivares' (2016) study on cabinet changes and ministerial survival during Chile’s Concertación governments provides comparative insights into how political contexts and coalition agreements affect ministerial tenure, relevant for understanding similar dynamics in Peru. Also include Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán's (2015) findings on minister turnover, critical events, and electoral timing, as well as Carreras' (2013) analysis of outsider presidents and inexperienced ministers in Latin America. Additionally, consider Avendaño and Dávila's (2012) insights on ministerial turnover and coalition stability in Chile, as they provide relevant comparative evidence on how political stability and coalition dynamics can influence ministerial durability. Further, incorporate Martínez-Gallardo's (2012) study on cabinet defections in presidential systems, which identifies political and institutional factors driving ministers to exit, offering nuanced insights into the determinants of ministerial survival relevant for the Peruvian case. Finally, integrate Fischer, Dowding, and Dumont's (2012) research on cabinet minister durability across countries, emphasizing their findings on the structural determinants influencing ministerial tenure and how these insights might translate to the Peruvian context. Additionally, Jara Íñiguez and Cedeño Alcívar's (2019) study on public executive turnover in Ecuador provides insights into whether managerial issues or political trust drive executive rotations, offering comparative perspectives on how trust-based appointments affect ministerial durability. Additionally, Mejía Guinand, Barinas Forero, and Mora Oviedo's (2021) analysis of cabinet survival in Colombia (1958–2018) offers a long-term presidential system perspective, highlighting temporal dynamics and political factors that further inform our understanding of ministerial durability in the Peruvian context.  
  **4. Research Design and Methodology**
* Unit of analysis: PCM term (start and end date per individual)
* Event: Exit from office (resignation, censure, removal)
* Censoring: PCMs still in office or where end date exceeds study period
* Method: Cox proportional hazards model

#### **Covariates:**

* Presidential approval
* Party alignment
* Congress fragmentation
* Crisis events (e.g., protests, motions of censure)
* Type of cabinet (technocratic vs political)
* Presidential period (e.g., Toledo, García II, Vizcarra)

### **5. Data**

#### **5.1 Sources**

* Official resolutions published in *El Peruano* (digital archive)
* Historical registers on the Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros (PCM) website
* Congressional records ("Congreso Digital")
* Secondary compilations (WorldStatesmen, Wikipedia page snapshots, press releases)

#### **5.2 Prime Ministers Dataset**

Full appointment data have been compiled and verified; the complete table (with start/end dates, verification flags, and computed durations) is now placed in **Appendix A** for readability. A CSV version is also available in the project data folder.

#### **5.3 Automated Wikipedia Scraper (Python prototype) Automated Wikipedia Scraper (Python prototype) Automated Wikipedia Scraper (Python prototype)**

import pandas as pd

# Pull tables from Wikipedia

url = "https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Presidentes\_del\_Consejo\_de\_Ministros\_del\_Perú"

tables = pd.read\_html(url, match="Siglo XXI")

# Combine XXI table with filtered rows from 1980 onward in XX table

siglo\_xxi = tables[0]

xx\_tables = pd.read\_html(url, match="Siglo XX")

siglo\_xx = xx\_tables[0]

# Filter rows where 'Inicio' year >= 1980

siglo\_xx\_1980 = siglo\_xx[siglo\_xx['Inicio'].str.contains('1980|1981|1982|1983|1984|1985|1986|1987|1988|1989')]

# Merge and clean

pcm\_df = pd.concat([siglo\_xx\_1980, siglo\_xxi], ignore\_index=True)

pcm\_df['Inicio'] = pd.to\_datetime(pcm\_df['Inicio'], dayfirst=True)

pcm\_df['Fin'] = pcm\_df['Fin'].replace({'En el cargo': pd.NaT})

pcm\_df['Fin'] = pd.to\_datetime(pcm\_df['Fin'], errors='coerce', dayfirst=True)

pcm\_df.to\_csv('pcm\_wiki\_1980\_present.csv', index=False)

print(pcm\_df.head())

*Run locally:* pip install pandas lxml html5lib before executing. The script exports **pcm\_wiki\_1980\_present.csv** with start and end dates plus party and president fields, which you can merge with our dataset to cross-verify against *El Peruano*.

### **6. Results. Results Results**

* Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
* Cox model coefficients and hazard ratios
* Diagnostics: proportional hazard assumption, Schoenfeld residuals
* Sub-analysis: periods of high instability (e.g., 2016–2021)

### **7. Robustness Checks**

* Parametric survival models (Weibull, exponential)
* Stratified models by presidential term
* Discrete-time models using monthly dummies

### **8. Discussion**

* Executive-legislative tension and ministerial durability
* Patterns of political delegation: loyalty vs technocracy
* Informal institutionalization of the PCM role

### **9. Conclusion**

* Summary of findings
* Broader implications for governance in presidential regimes with PM‑like appointees
* Extensions: ministers of economy, subnational cases, cross‑national comparison

### **Appendix A. Prime Ministers of Peru, 1980 – Present**

*(Verification in progress — see legend in §5.2)*

| **#** | **Prime Minister** | **Start** | **End / Status** | **V** | **Duration (days)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Manuel Ulloa Elías | 28‑07‑1980 | 09‑12‑1982 | Y | 864 |
| 2 | Fernando Schwalb López‑Aldana | 09‑12‑1982 | 10‑04‑1984 | Y | 488 |
| 3 | Sandro Mariátegui Chiappe | 10‑04‑1984 | 13‑10‑1984 | P | 186 |
| 4 | Luis Pércovich Roca | 13‑10‑1984 | 27‑07‑1985 | P | 287 |
| 5 | Luis Alva Castro | 28‑07‑1985 | 26‑06‑1987 | P | 698 |
| 6 | Guillermo Larco Cox (1st) | 27‑06‑1987 | 13‑05‑1988 | P | 321 |
| 7 | Armando Villanueva del Campo | 13‑05‑1988 | 15‑05‑1989 | P | 367 |
| 8 | Luis Alberto Sánchez | 15‑05‑1989 | 30‑09‑1989 | P | 138 |
| 9 | Guillermo Larco Cox (2nd) | 30‑09‑1989 | 27‑07‑1990 | P | 300 |
| 10 | Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller | 28‑07‑1990 | 20‑02‑1991 | Y | 207 |
| 11 | Carlos Torres y Torres Lara | 20‑02‑1991 | 06‑11‑1991 | Y | 259 |
| 12 | Alfonso de los Heros Pérez‑Albela | 06‑11‑1991 | 06‑04‑1992 | Y | 152 |
| 13 | Óscar de la Puente Raygada | 06‑04‑1992 | 28‑08‑1993 | P | 509 |
| 14 | Alfonso Bustamante y Bustamante | 28‑08‑1993 | 17‑02‑1994 | P | 173 |
| 15 | Efraín Goldenberg Schreiber | 17‑02‑1994 | 28‑07‑1995 | P | 526 |
| 16 | Dante Córdova Blanco | 27‑07‑1995 | 03‑04‑1996 | P | 251 |
| 17 | Alberto Pandolfi Arbulú (1st) | 03‑04‑1996 | 04‑06‑1998 | W | 792 |
| 18 | Javier Valle Riestra González | 04‑06‑1998 | 21‑08‑1998 | W | 78 |
| 19 | Alberto Pandolfi Arbulú (2nd) | 21‑08‑1998 | 03‑01‑1999 | W | 135 |
| 20 | Víctor Joy Way Rojas | 03‑01‑1999 | 10‑10‑1999 | W | 280 |
| 21 | José Alberto Bustamante Belaúnde | 10‑10‑1999 | 29‑07‑2000 | W | 293 |
| 22 | Federico Salas Guevara | 29‑07‑2000 | 22‑11‑2000 | W | 116 |
| 23 | Javier Pérez de Cuéllar | 22‑11‑2000 | 28‑07‑2001 | W | 248 |
| 24 | Roberto Dañino Zapata | 28‑07‑2001 | 11‑07‑2002 | W | 348 |
| 25 | Luis Solari | 12‑07‑2002 | 23‑06‑2003 | W | 346 |
| 26 | Beatriz Merino | 23‑06‑2003 | 12‑12‑2003 | W | 172 |
| 27 | Carlos Ferrero | 15‑12‑2003 | 16‑08‑2005 | W | 610 |
| 28 | Pedro Pablo Kuczynski | 16‑08‑2005 | 28‑07‑2006 | W | 346 |
| 29 | Jorge del Castillo | 28‑07‑2006 | 10‑10‑2008 | W | 805 |
| 30 | Yehude Simon | 14‑10‑2008 | 11‑07‑2009 | W | 270 |
| 31 | Javier Velásquez | 11‑07‑2009 | 13‑09‑2010 | W | 429 |
| 32 | José Antonio Chang | 14‑09‑2010 | 18‑03‑2011 | W | 185 |
| 33 | Rosario Fernández | 19‑03‑2011 | 28‑07‑2011 | W | 131 |
| 34 | Salomón Lerner Ghitis | 28‑07‑2011 | 10‑12‑2011 | W | 135 |
| 35 | Óscar Valdés | 11‑12‑2011 | 23‑07‑2012 | W | 225 |
| 36 | Juan Jiménez Mayor | 23‑07‑2012 | 29‑10‑2013 | W | 463 |
| 37 | César Villanueva (1st) | 31‑10‑2013 | 24‑02‑2014 | W | 116 |
| 38 | René Cornejo | 24‑02‑2014 | 22‑07‑2014 | W | 148 |
| 39 | Ana Jara | 22‑07‑2014 | 02‑04‑2015 | W | 254 |
| 40 | Pedro Cateriano (1st) | 02‑04‑2015 | 28‑07‑2016 | W | 483 |
| 41 | Fernando Zavala | 28‑07‑2016 | 15‑09‑2017 | W | 414 |
| 42 | Mercedes Aráoz | 17‑09‑2017 | 23‑03‑2018 | W | 187 |
| 43 | César Villanueva (2nd) | 02‑04‑2018 | 08‑03‑2019 | W | 340 |
| 44 | Salvador del Solar | 11‑03‑2019 | 30‑09‑2019 | W | 203 |
| 45 | Vicente Zeballos | 30‑09‑2019 | 15‑07‑2020 | W | 289 |
| 46 | Pedro Cateriano (2nd) | 15‑07‑2020 | 06‑08‑2020 | W | 22 |
| 47 | Walter Martos | 06‑08‑2020 | 10‑11‑2020 | W | 96 |
| 48 | Ántero Flores‑Aráoz | 11‑11‑2020 | 17‑11‑2020 | W | 6 |
| 49 | Violeta Bermúdez | 18‑11‑2020 | 28‑07‑2021 | W | 252 |
| 50 | Guido Bellido | 29‑07‑2021 | 06‑10‑2021 | W | 70 |
| 51 | Mirtha Vásquez | 06‑10‑2021 | 31‑01‑2022 | W | 117 |
| 52 | Héctor Valer | 01‑02‑2022 | 08‑02‑2022 | W | 7 |
| 53 | Aníbal Torres | 08‑02‑2022 | 24‑11‑2022 | W | 289 |
| 54 | Betssy Chávez | 25‑11‑2022 | 07‑12‑2022 | W | 12 |
| 55 | Pedro Angulo Arana | 10‑12‑2022 | 21‑12‑2022 | W | 11 |
| 56 | Alberto Otárola | 21‑12‑2022 | 05‑03‑2024 | W | 440 |
| 57 | Gustavo Adrianzén | 06‑03‑2024 | *Incumbent* | W | 429 |